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The City of London has long attracted much academic and popular attention. Its 
political influence, in particular, has been a recurring theme of debate over decades. That was 
also the case in Youssef Cassis’ early work on City bankers and financiers of the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth century (Cassis 1984; 1987; 1994). In the sections addressing 
this question in his early books, Youssef Cassis analysed if and how City bankers imposed 
their views on the British government and stated in particular that such influence was not so 
much exerted by pressure group or through the Parliament, but more through informal and 
regular contacts between the political elite and the City elite. Cassis further argued that there 
was no need for the City to really pressure the British government because the City’s interests 
and the government’s interests often coincided. Despite a wide literature on the City, 
however, its relationship with the EEC is still under-researched. 
 This article explores the relationship between the City and the EEC, from the 
accession of the UK to the EEC in 1973 to the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, which was meant 
to be the year of the completion of the single financial market. Based on the archival material 
of the Bank of England, the British Bankers Association, several British commercial banks, 
the European Union, and, for comparative purposes, of the Bank of France, the French 
ministry of finance oral archives, and several French commercial banks, the article explores 
two areas: the influence of City actors on EEC financial regulation, and how this influence 
was actually exerted. It pays particular attention to two committees chaired by the Bank of 
England, the City Liaison Committee and the City EEC Liaison Committee, and to British 
banks. The City Liaison Committee was an organisation which had been reorganised by the 
Bank of England in the early 1970s at the prospect of the forthcoming entry of the United 
Kingdom to the EEC, with a view to discuss and defend the interests of the City. It was not 
meant, however, to focus on EEC issues exclusively, and it soon created a subcommittee, the 
City EEC Liaison Committee, to deal with EEC affairs. The article argues that if the EEC 
played a part in the formalisation of British banking regulation, the City also played a key 
role in shaping EEC plans for financial regulation.  
Since the concept of ‘gentlemanly capitalism’ was forged by Cain and Hopkin in the 
1980s to highlight the weight of the City in nineteenth century British imperialism (Cain and 
Hopkins 1986; 1987), much work has been done to support or oppose their argument. Michie 
and Williamson, in their collective book on the City of London and the British government in 
the twentieth century, tended to revise this view, stressing that the City was heterogeneous 
and did not have one single view on any political issue, while the government was not 
monolithic either (Michie and Williamson 2004). The relationship between the Treasury, the 
Bank of England and the City was not as close as commonly thought either. Although the 
concept of gentlemanly capitalism was framed in the context of a debate on the antagonism 
between industry and finance in nineteenth century Britain (Daunton 1989), it soon became 
closely associated with the City and its club-like organisation and informal regulation, where 
mutual trust and acquaintances played a major role. In this perspective, a recurring theme in 
the literature has been the end of this classic, club-like, and informally regulated organisation 
of the City. In his monumental history of the City, Kynaston entitled the volume IV on the 
period 1945-2000 ‘A Club no more.’ Kynaston stresses the transition to a new world, marked 
by formal regulation, new institutions, and where traditional networks and reliance on 
instincts and trust had given place to a heartless world of analyses, anonymity and greed. 
Several publications have talked about the ‘death of gentlemanly capitalism,’ with the 
invasion of foreign institutions, particularly in investment banking (Augar 2000; Roberts 
2005). As early as 1981, Moran analysed the profound changes that the City was going 
through, and the impact this had on the way it exerted influence over British politics, from a 
social style of incorporation to a formal and direct style of incorporation (Moran 1981). In his 
analysis of the British regulatory state, Moran argued that the 1970s were a revolution in the 
British style of regulation, where the club like, informal and gentleman approach to 
regulation was replaced by a much more formal and fragmented approach to regulation 
(Moran 2003).  
This theme of traditional club style approach to regulation is closely intertwined with 
that of political influence, another long-debated theme of the historiography of the City. 
Davies has scrutinized the relationship between the Labour government and the City between 
1959 and 1979, focussing on the specific issues of the 1960s and 1970s, in particular the 
development of insurance and pension funds, of growth of the Eurodollar market, and the rise 
of inflation (Davies 2017). He stresses the role of lobbying by think tanks and City actors, 
and pays particular attention to the Committee on Invisible Exports, created in 1966 to 
promote the City’s contribution to the UK’s balance of payment, and which would have 
enduring role in defending the City’s interests in international forums. However, he does not 
pay attention, like most of the existing literature, to the City’s institutional response to the 
British entry to the EEC. The City Liaison Committee and City EEC Liaison Committee 
played an important role in that matter.  
The question of the political influence of the City also relate to much debated 
questions in political science, such as the importance of corporatism or, on the contrary, of 
widely distributed interests among businesses in business-government relations, the 
respective influence of market forces and politics, and issues of collective actions within 
business organisations (Woll 2006; Coen, Grant, and Wilson 2010). In the specific area of 
EEC/EU, the nature of the political system of the EU and the europeanisation of interest 
representation have also attracted much work. The micropolitical approach to these questions 
have led to an interest for a political theory of the firm (Coen, Grant, and Wilson 2010). Of 
course, measuring pressure group influence is difficult (Grant 1995). Not only was the City 
not a coherent entity with only one voice, but also is it difficult to assert that one or the other 
action its members conducted was instrumental in shaping a regulation. On top of that, City 
actors were never alone in pushing or resisting a regulation or an aspect of a regulatory 
proposal. There were always alliances and compromises with other countries. The City was 
not really a ‘policy entrepreneur’ because its members did not really welcome the formal 
regulations that the EEC developed, which was very different from the traditional informal 
approach to regulation of the City’s financial community. However, City actors were very 
active in defending their interests in the context of the accession to the EEC, and were 
eventually satisfied with the outcome of the Single European Market.  
Despite the diversity and quality of the literature, little has been written on the 
relationship between the City and the European Economic Community in the 1970s and 
1980s, a period which by all accounts appears as a dramatic change also for the history of the 
City,  and despite the accession of the UK in 1973. Sargent has analysed the role of the 
British Bankers Association as a pressure group in the EEC, but only focussing on the 1970s 
and on the British Bankers’ Association, and not on the City, on how influence was actually 
exerted, or on the formalisation of British financial regulation (Sargent 1982). Josselin, on the 
other hand, mostly focused on the late 1980s and on how the EEC integration process 
affected ‘policy networks’ in France and the United Kingdom (Josselin 1997). Neither of 
them paid much attention to the coordinating role of the City Liaison Committee and City 
EEC Liaison Committee, chaired from the 1970s onwards by the Bank of England. Yet 
taking into account this institutional structure is important for understanding properly the 
institutional response of the City as a whole to the accession to the EEC, and the broader 
impact of the City on EEC financial regulation. More generally, little archival based research 
has been made on the adaptation of the City to the EEC. When looking at international 
factors of change in the City’s history, most of the literature has looked at the United States. 
Yet the EEC part of the story was important for two reasons. First, in the European 
discussions on financial regulation in the 1970s and 1980s, the ‘informal’ style of regulation, 
seen as typical of the United Kingdom, was systematically opposed to the ‘continental’ – 
more formal – style of regulation of other EEC countries by British financial actors and 
central bankers. Was the formalisation of British regulation a ‘Europeanisation’? This point 
has been raised by several scholars, although mostly focussing on the state and not on private 
actors (Dyson 2000a; 2000b; Moran 2003, 164–71). Second, if the EEC has had an impact on 
City life, what was the influence of the City on EEC banking and financial regulation in 
return? This question, like the involvement of non-state actors in European integration more 
generally, is still under researched in history. City actors and in particular British banks 
adapted very successfully to the world of organised lobbying, and in this field, they were at 
the forefront rather than lagging behind. The article will first assess the influence of City 
actors and of the UK more generally on EEC financial regulation, and then examine how this 






 The City’s adaptation to the accession to the EEC proved rather successful. When 
looking at the three areas of insurance, banking and securities activities, the UK often had a 
key role in opposing moves in one direction or supporting moves in another. In the early 
1970s, the UK was instrumental in watering down the first banking directive proposal of the 
European Commission, which was considered too formal and ambitious (Sargent 1982). The 
proposal had triggered a wide-spread rejection of the British financial actors who saw it as an 
attempt to increase regulation in the United Kingdom.  Until the early 1980s, the British 
banks looked at European plans in banking and financial spheres with considerable distrust 
and, although they favoured EEC membership in general, were opposed to the plans for 
harmonisation – understood as a convergence with continental regulation – in banking 
regulation (Drach 2020). This section explores the influence – or at least the satisfaction – of 
the British financial industry in the field of banking, insurance, capital movement 
liberalisation and securities in the EEC. 
 The British banking community was successful in shaping the second banking 
directive of the EEC. This directive, enacted in December 1989, was an important piece in 
the establishment of a common market in banking because it embodied the adoption of the 
mutual recognition principle, which the British Bankers’ Association had long supported,1 
and ensured the freedom to establish and provide services throughout the Community. 
Indeed, the idea of recognising each member state regulatory system as sufficient for 
authorising banks to establish and provide services throughout the community (the mutual 
recognition principle) had been promoted by a European Banking Federation (EBF) 
discussion paper drafted by the BBA in 1981,2 and by an IBRO (Inter-Bank Research 
Organisation, an organisation close to the British Bankers’ Association)3 research paper in 
1980.4 Overall, the BBA was satisfied that the directive, which had a long story, evolved 
from a focus on harmonisation to a focus of mutual recognition, much more liberal in 
principle, and was combined with other liberalisation measures, such as the liberalisation of 
capital flows. The BBA exerted influence by coming very regularly to the Commission, 
suggesting changes in proposals and contacting directly the DG XV to express their views, 
and through taking a very active role in the EBF, as we shall see in the next pages. The City 
Liaison Committee also played in role in channeling the BBA and other City organisations’ 
views to the British government and the British representation in Brussels. 
The main subject of disagreement between countries and between banks from various 
countries on this directive was the question of reciprocity: the French banks and government, 
in particular, wanted to introduce a reciprocity clause in the directive to gain some leverage 
on non-EEC countries, for instance on Japan, when negotiating their entry to the European 
market.5 In particular, French banks complained that access to the Japanese market was 
difficult and wanted that, if a truly common banking market was established in the EEC, 
access to this EEC market by Japanese banks should be conditional to an equal access in 
Japan from EEC banks.  The British government and the City, on the other hand, were 
radically opposed to the whole idea of reciprocity as they feared it would damage the 
attractiveness of the City as an international financial centre. At the July 1988 meeting of the 
City Liaison Committee, Sir Jeremy Morse, president of the BBA and of Lloyds Bank stated 
that ‘the BBA were at one with the UK Government in seeking clear deregulation of markets 
and in seeking to avoid the erection of barriers round the European Community.’6 A fierce 
political battle took place on the question.7 Eventually, the British view was satisfied, and no 
strict limitation was enacted.8 The BBA was also influential in two other areas of the second 
banking directive: the definition of ‘credit institutions’ to which the directive would apply 
(the scope of the directive), and the inclusion of securities services in it. On the first point, the 
BBA wished to maintain the definition used in the 1977 directive, considered as rather 
restrictive, because it would allow banks, and not other financial institutions, to conduct a 
whole range of activities across the EEC. The 1977 definition was eventually retained in the 
final directive. On the second point, they stressed the importance of including securities 
services in the directive during European Banking Federation (EBF) discussions, which they 
thereafter obtained from the Commission.9  
British influence was also important in the field of insurance. In 1978, the EEC had 
enacted a directive on co-insurance which was supposed to foster the development of 
insurance activities throughout Europe, but had not resulted in any commercial benefit for 
British insurers, who had complained accordingly, because national restrictions in other states 
had limited the effect of the directive.10 Four cases in this area (relating to four countries: 
France, Germany, Denmark and Ireland) were brought to the European Court of Justice. 
These cases opposed, on the one hand the Commission, supported by the UK and the 
Netherlands, and on the other hand France, Germany, Denmark, Ireland, supported by 
Belgium and Italy. In December 1986, the European Court of justice issued a ruling declaring 
illegal existing national regulations blocking cross-border provision of insurance services.11 
This ruling further unlocked the negotiation of the second non-life insurance directive, which 
was enacted in June 1988. The UK had been particularly instrumental in both processes. As 
usual, influence was exerted through several ways. For the ruling of the European Court of 
Justice, it was the European Commission who lead the case against Germany, France, 
Denmark and Ireland, and which received the official support of British and Dutch 
government, with a strong support of the British insurance industry. In the case of the 1988 
second non-life insurance directive, British insurers combined multiple approaches. They 
directly pleaded their case to the European Commission and briefed members of the 
European Parliament involved.12 As early as 1976, when the proposal for the second non-life 
insurance directive was submitted, the British Insurers’ European Committee (BIEC) 
declared that ‘taken as a whole it is a very acceptable document, and its overall effect is to 
recommend that the draft directive should for forward.’13 British insurers, and, indirectly, the 
City Liaison Committee, were also active in convincing the British government to defend 
their interests. In July 1978, the British Insurers’ European Committee and the UK Insurance 
Brokers’ European Committee had advocated the importance of this directive to the House of 
Lords Select Committee, which had eventually concluded ‘that it was essential to the interest 
of the UK insurance industry that this directive should be adopted and implemented without 
delay.’14 Years after years, the records of the City EEC liaison committee show an unfailing 
support to the directive, and an equivalent frustration of its slow progress, due to the number 
of technical problems or low interest from other member states. At the July 1988 City Liaison 
Committee meeting, the Bank of England governor praised the issuing of the directive, which 
had ‘long ranked high on our list of desirable measures.’15  
In the 1980s, the City, and the British government, also supported the liberalisation of 
capital movements in the Community. The Treaty of Rome, which had established the EEC, 
already contained provisions for the liberalisation of capital flows in the EEC in its article 67. 
A few measures had been taken in that direction in 1960 and 1962, but the question had 
turned into a political deadlock, in particular because of the reluctance of several member 
states to lose control on their monetary policy (Bakker 1996).16 In the EEC debates, the 
question of the liberalisation of capital movements primarily revolved around monetary 
issues: controls, where they existed, were meant to help fighting inflation or to protect 
currencies against speculative attacks. The German government, who was the most outspoken 
supporter of capital movement liberalisation, also did so for monetary reasons, as it 
conceived the free movement of capital as a healthy constraint on governments’ economic 
and monetary policy. In the UK, however, the support for liberalisation of capital movements 
was also linked to business interest, as financial institutions hoped to expand their business 
with capital movements liberalisation. The Committee on Invisible Exports, representing the 
City’s interests, had promoted the abolition of exchange controls in the UK since the late 
1960s (Davies 2017, 170). In February 1978, an internal note at National Westminster Bank, 
drafted in preparation for a lunch with the British EEC commissioner Christopher Tugendhat, 
gave an overview of British banks on exchange controls, which were still in place in the 
UK.17 It argued that ‘the present exchange control regulations are an inhibition on the 
activities of the City of London and place an unreasonable burden on the banks in London.’18 
While the British exchange controls were abolished in October 1979, the wider question of 
capital movements in the EEC persisted (On the abolition of exchange controls in the UK, 
see Capie 2010, 766–72). In a 1980 study by the Inter-Bank Research Organisation already 
mentioned, the author repeatedly stated that exchange controls and withholding taxes on bank 
interest paid to non-residents were more important barriers to integration than the lack of 
harmonisation in banking legislations.19 In a 1983 internal report from the French central 
bank on how that question was debated at the October 1983 meeting of the EEC Monetary 
Committee, the French member stated that the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and 
Germany supported without any reservation the liberalisation of capital movements in the 
Community, for both theoretical and practical reasons.20 In this respect, Abdelal’s claims that 
France was leading the way towards liberalisation is exaggerated, as the French records show 
only a late endorsement of a progressive liberalisation, and on the condition of better 
economic coordination in the EEC, whereas the UK, like Germany, favored rapid and full 
liberalisation.21 The pressure from the City’s organisations for the liberalisation of capital 
movements took various forms, as different professional associations called for it in their 
own requests on various matters: the BBA did it when commenting in 1980 and 1981 on the 
conditions for a real common market in banking, and the securities industry also favored it 
when reacting to the first directive proposals in capital market activities in the mid 1970s.22 
In March 1985, when preparing for a meeting with the British ambassador the EEC, Sir 
Michael Butler, a member of the BBA wrote to another: ‘The banks should support all efforts 
of the Commission to reduce barriers to cross-frontier services business, no matter whether 
the immediate beneficiary is insurance, investment or any other service: all freedom of 
services directives are valuable building blocks against national protectionism and towards a 
common market in banking and finance.’23 He further stated that the ‘BBA is […] wholly 
supportive of the Commission’s efforts to break down the barriers to international private and 
public and capital flows, and to open up the investment markets of the EEC to allow investors 
a freer choice of homes for their savings.’24 The eventual liberalisation of capital movements, 
which was enacted through a directive in June 1988,25 was not the result of the City’s 
pressure only, however, since the German and the Dutch governments had also been strong 
supporters of capital movements liberalisation, as that France’s 1983 turn from expansionary 
to stability-oriented policies also played an important role. Lord Cockfield and Jacques 
Delors, the president of the Commission, were also instrumental in putting the liberalisation 
of capital movements high on the agenda of the Commission. The City’s organisations were 
part of a wider group favouring the liberalisation of capital movements.  
City actors were also influential in the area of securities activities. First of all, the 
British commissioner in charge of financial institutions, Christopher Tugendhat, played a key 
role in initiating the Commission’s work for a greater integration of European securities 
markets in 1980.26 Secondly, in December 1985, the enactment of the directive on the 
undertaking for collective investment in transferable securities (UCITS directive), was an 
important step in the realisation of the European securities market, and had been promoted by 
the Bank of England and City EEC Liaison Committee (CELC).27 It enabled unit trusts and 
other similar kind financial institutions to market their units, which were close to shares but 
with legal and pricing differences, throughout the Community, as long as they were 
authorised by one member state.28 The origins of the directive dated back to the early to mid 
1970, as part of the Commission’s plans for promoting the freedom of financial services. The 
British financial industry (in particular the Association of Unit Trust Mangers and the 
Association of Investment Trust Companies) was, from 1975 on, broadly in favour of the 
directive, as it considered it had been devised with a very extensive consultation with the 
private sector, and was associated with a partial liberalisation of capital movements29. 
However, the adoption was blocked several years at the Council level. Here again, the City 
EEC Liaison Committee and its members associations conveyed their views through contacts 
with the Department of Trade and Industry, the Bank of England, the Treasury and the 
Commission, but the impasse was largely due to disagreements at the government level 
between other member states. Eventually enacted in December 1985, it was the first directive 
of the financial sector, before banking, to apply the principle of mutual recognition. The 
CELC wholly welcomed this directive, but it expected that Germany would resist it, as they 
had resisted the 1978 insurance directive.30 In addition, at the November 1985 meeting of the 
CELC, the delegate from the Accepting Houses Committee, Bartlett, raised the fact that the 
recent 1984 Finance Act in the UK could limit the usefulness of the directive, and that a 
representation made of delegates from the BBA, the Accepting Houses, the Issuing Houses 
and the Unit Trust Associations had been made to British ministers in this perspective: the 
EEC directive was also used by City actors as leverage domestically.31 Lastly, the British 
financial industry was also instrumental in defending the place of London in the negotiation 
of the Investment Services Directive (ISD), the equivalent of the Second banking directive 
for the securities sector, in the late 1980s, even though the battle on this directive soon 
became primarily government-led (Warren 1995; Licht 1997). The directive proposal, which 
started to be discussed at the CLC in 1988, rapidly opposed the North Sea Alliance (United 
Kingdom, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands and Denmark) to the so-called Club Med 
(France, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece and Belgium), on the question of regulated markets. 
The British financial industry used a powerful alliance with the Germany, and the support of 
the commissioner Brittan, to defend their views, which mostly consisted in defending the 
London Stock Exchange and its Automated Quotation System (SEAQ) against the French 
resolute efforts to promote the financial centre of Paris, but the situation was blocked for 
many years.32 The British financial industry used the same channels as for other directives: 
contacts with the British authorities (Bank of England, the Treasury, the Department of Trade 
and Industry and, to a lesser extent, members of parliament), direct lobbying at the 
Commission and at the DG XV in particular, use of European peak associations such as the 
EBF (Josselin 1997, 39, 92–93, 95). After the ISD was adopted in 1993, the UK was the only 
country which did not require any substantial change in its legislation for implementing the 
directive (Ferrarini 1998, 4–5). The directive was analysed as favouring London on the whole 
(Warren 1995). 
Was the City better organised than other countries’ financial sector? While an 
overview of all the other EEC member states financial sector is beyond the scope of this 
article, a comparison with the French case can highlight the British specificity. French banks 
and financial actors usually relied more on their authorities to convey their views to Brussels, 
and were less involved in EEC regulatory matters in general. In particular, they relied on the 
Treasury, the Banque de France and the Direction des Relations Économiques Extérieures 
(DREE) (Josselin 1997, 129).33 In addition, the French equivalent of the BBA, the French 
Banks’ Association (Association Française des Banques), was far from having the same 
weight as its British counterpart.34 In an interview given in January 1993, the financial 
director from the Crédit Commercial de France contrasted the sense of belonging to the City 
with the absence of such cohesiveness in Paris. He noted that the City was very efficient to 
defend its interests when needed. Like several other French bankers of the time, he lamented 
on the lack of involvement of French banking structures in EEC matters: ‘In general the 
preparation of negotiations is light and even light-headed to a point that the good results seem 
rather surprising. The British and Germans are beyond measure more serious than the French 
who could be compared to Asterix and Obelix before the Roman armies.’35 This does not 
mean that France was not influential in EEC financial matters: generally French authorities 
and banking community were at least partly satisfied with the eventual outcome of 
negotiations. However, a substantial part of this influence was exercised by various 
governmental bodies, and not by the private sector directly (Josselin 1997, 97, 116). In the 
1970s and early 1980s, the French banks did not have, neither collectively or individually, the 




The influence of City banks and financial institutions drew on an efficient 
institutional and personal network. This section explores the formal and informal contacts 
that existed between City actors and the EEC. Overall the British entry to the European 
Community triggered much institutional efforts from the City and the Bank of England to 
defend their interests. Even though it had to cope with a diversity of views, the entry in the 
Community prompted a defensive move of the City which enabled more cohesiveness than 
there usually was in front of a common enemy.  
Within the City itself, the entry to the EEC triggered an efficient institutional response 
in the early 1970s.  In 1972, the governor of the Bank of England took the chair of the City 
Liaison Committee (CLC), which had been initially created in 1965 to provide support to the 
City member of the National Economic Development Council.36 The CLC was made of high-
level officers of various City institutions and became a forum to coordinate and defend the 
interests of the City as a whole. The reorganization of the CLC by the Bank of England in 
1972 was closely linked to the coming accession of the UK to the EEC. However, the City 
Liaison Committee was not meant to focus exclusively on EEC matters and technical details, 
and subcommittee was soon created to handle these questions, the City EEC Liaison 
Committee. In what looked like a panic of City actors in view of what they considered, 
somewhat indistinctively, as a ‘continental’ model of statutory, formal, and dirigiste 
regulation, the Bank of England seized the opportunity to organise and coordinate the City 
response. It organised a preliminary meeting of City interests at the Bank of England in July 
1973, where the participants discussed the best ways and channels to have an influence on the 
Commission.37 In an internal note on the meeting, the chief cashier of the Bank of England, 
who chaired the meeting, argued that the merit of this meeting was that it had enabled ‘those 
present to exchange information and views among themselves.’38 This was one of the main 
reasons for such an organisation: to complement the bilateral contacts which existed between 
individual associations or sectors and the Bank of England by multilateral contacts where all 
the City interests could inform each other of their interests, concerns and progress. The chief 
cashier considered the meeting positively: ‘I think we have established here a useful bit of 
machinery.’39 By the end of the year, the City EEC group, with Peter Cooke as chairman, was 
definitely established as a subcommittee of the City Liaison Committee.40 The City EEC 
Liaison Committee usually met three times a year, and each meeting addressed general EEC 
development plus the following themes: taxation, insurance, capital markets, credit 
institutions, and company law.41 In the preparation of these meetings, the secretary of the 
City EEC Committee received background notes from the member associations. The Bank of 
England set up a wide information gathering process drawing on the members themselves 
and on a network of institutions in Brussels and London.  In order to convey the concerns 
expressed in these groups to the British government, the City EEC Liaison also sent the 
background notes and minutes of each meeting to the Treasury, the Department of Trade and 
Industry, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, and the Cabinet Office.42 In addition, the 
CELC often invited special guests to address specific issues. 
About ten years after the UK accession to the Community, the ‘EEC shock’ had been 
absorbed and efficient institutional structures were in place to convey City’s and sectoral 
views to the British government and the European Commission. Several subcommittees, in 
addition to the EEC committee, were now in place. As these subcommittees were doing most 
of the work, the governor decided to stop the regular meetings of the top umbrella committee, 
the CLC, and only call it when necessary.43 As a result, there was no meeting of the CLC 
between March 1983 and 1988. However, in 1988, as the European machinery was engaging 
in an ambitious programme for the completion of the single market by 1992, with very 
serious stakes for the financial sector, the City Liaison Committee was convened again on a 
regular basis.44 Once again, it was the EEC activity that had revived the CLC, even though it 
was not supposed to focus on EEC matters exclusively. 
The British Bankers’ Association (BBA) was another key actor of the City and was 
also revived by the UK accession to the EEC. Created in 1920, it had been dormant for some 
time, but the British entry to the EEC gave it a prominent role (Sargent 1982, 271; Cassis 
1994, 277). The BBA was particularly well-organized concerning EEC matters. It played a 
dynamic role in the European Banking Federation itself, regularly calling for a better 
organization or a stronger lead.45  
 After joining the EBF as the result of the British entry to the EEC, the BBA regularly 
pushed for a stronger and more dynamic Banking Federation. In 1977, Tom Soper from 
Barclays  considered that the resources of the EBF, in particular the size of its staff, had to be 
increased, stating rather blatantly : ‘the present contribution, high as it is, is not really worth 
the money […] We should, in short, either pay more or get out’.46 Not seriously considering 
to get out, Soper then listed desirable objectives to make the EBF more efficient, next to 
increasing its resources, such as striving to get an early information and influence on the 
Commission’s work on a new directive, and acting through national government institutions 
and the UK representation office  in Brussels (the UKREP), when a directive was in the 
hands of the Council. Not all member associations shared the BBA’s desire to reinforce the 
EBF, however, and in 1978 a member of the BBA lamented on the reduction of its secretariat 
and suggested areas to improve, such as a closer relationship with commission officials or an 
improvement of the EBF machinery enabling to learn at an earlier stage the initial thinking of 
the Commission.47 It also suggested to make EBF internal divisions explicit rather than 
providing weak views, to staff the EBF working groups with more experienced bankers 
which could exress the views of their bank and to set up authorised alternates in order to be 
able to call meetings at a shorter notice. More generally, the BBA drafted several important 
papers for the EBF, such as a discussion paper on the role of the EBF itself, in 1978, or the 
already mentioned paper which served as an EBF discussion paper for the Commission in 
1981.48 Still in 1983, the BBA regretted that the EBF often wished to express unanimous 
views, which made it to adapt to the lowest common denominator.49 In 1985, the BBA again 
regretted the lack of leadership from the president of the EBF.50 If the BBA was at times 
disapointed by the EBF, it was also a driving force behind it.  
The BBA also set up its own regular visits to Brussels. These visits usually occurred 
between three and four times a year and the people met were diverse, ranging from DGs 
involved in economic and financial affairs to officials of the EBF, the UK representation 
office in Brussels, or members of the European Parliament (almost systematically 
conservatives). Each visit was prepared with notes on all subjects of interest to banks, from 
banking directives and company law to consumer protection and information and 
consultation of employees in multinational companies (the so-called Vredeling proposal), and 
was followed by detailed reports on each point.51 Such a well-organised involvement in EEC 
affairs did not exist in the French equivalent to the BBA, the French banks’ association. The 
BBA was the national association that the head of the DG XV was seeing the most frequently 
(Josselin 1997, 141).  
At the level of the European Commission, a key division for financial matters was the 
DG XV, in charge of banks, insurances and financial institutions. British influence was 
known for being important on that DG.  In an interview given in December 1992, a French 
official of the French Banks Association stated that the British banks usually managed to get 
an early influence on Commission’s initiatives because they had several British nationals in 
key places in the Commission.52 In her study of the creation of the European financial 
market, Josselin also argued that DG XV had the reputation of being very British (Josselin 
1997, 141). From its creation in 1973, to 1977, a British national, Robin Hutton, had been 
director of the Directorate A in charge of banks and insurance companies in the DG XV.53 
Hutton’s departure from the Commission in 1977 was closely followed by British banks: 
‘Hutton is likely to leave the EEC some time this year. He has been a tower of strength and 
we must do our best to ensure that he is replaced by someone else from the City.’54 Hutton 
later became himself a member of the BBA, and was several times part of the BBA’s visits to 
Brussels in the 1980s.55 From 1986 on, the director general of DG XV, Geoffrey Fitchew, 
was a British national, as well as, from 1987 on, his assistant, Robert Hull. Overall, personal 
contacts with various officials both in EEC institutions and in the British government were 
very important in the City’s organisations continuous attempts to participate to the regulatory 
process. 
Above DG XV, the UK had influential commissioners on which the City network 
relied: Christopher Tugendhat, Lord Cockfield, and Leon Brittan. All these three 
commissioners had special responsibility for financial institutions and were responsible for 
DG XV: to some extent, the job of the DG XV’s head was to assist them.56 As a result, from 
1977 until the end of the period covered in this article, 1992, all the commissioners in charge 
of financial regulation were British. Christopher Tugendhat played a key role in promoting 
the work of the Commission in the area of banking (in particular, on the Commission’s early 
work on own funds) and securities in the late 1970s and early 1980s.57 Himself having been a 
consultant for Wood MacKenzie & Co, a stockbroker company, and having hold various 
senior positions in oil industry companies, he also had close links with City people. He was 
invited several times to the City EEC Committee. He was also regularly visited by BBA 
delegates (for example in February and June 1980,58 in November 1981,59 or in September 
198360) and by individual banks’, such as National Westminster.61 He had also been a 
member of the British parliament from 1970 to 1977, as the conservative MP for the Cities of 
London and Westminster/City of London and Westminster South constituencies.62 To some 
extent, he was a political representative of the City. Lord Cockfield, vice-president of the 
Commission between 1985 and 1988 was the father of the White Paper on the completion of 
the internal market, which had been welcomed by the City and the BBA. Leon Brittan, 
commissioner for Competition from 1989 to 1995, was a key actor of the EEC’s financial 
policy during the ‘horizon 1992’ period. In preparation of a lunch with Leon Brittan in 
January 1991, the French Banks Association stated that with him, Thatcherite liberalism and 
the City’s interests were well represented in Brussels.63 The French Banks Association tended 
to see him positively despite a perceived different culture from the French, and argued that he 
had handled the banking directives very well. 
The British financial community was also a source of expertise for the Commission. 
The Commission was regularly calling from an active role of banks to suggest priorities to 
work on in the EEC, and the BBA, as one of the most frequent visitors to the EEC and one of 
the most active members of the EBF, was in a key position to deliver on that matter. In 1981, 
the BBA drafted for the EBF a discussion paper to be sent to the Commission as an effort to 
adopt a more constructive approach to the EEC.64 The EBF/BBA paper substantially drew on 
an earlier study, the 1980 IBRO paper on the Commission’s plan to establish a ‘common 
market in banking’ mentioned above. Regular contacts between the BBA and the 
Commission also existed through correspondence and were sometimes a way to exchange 
ideas. For example, in September 1984, Peter Troberg from the DG XV of the Commission 
wrote to J.M. Evans, assistant secretary of the British Bankers’ Association, who regularly 
met Troberg on the occasion of his visits to Brussels. Troberg asked Evans if they could talk 
about the blurring of boundaries between insurance, banking and securities activities that he 
had studied in the US case. He particularly wanted to know to what extent such changes were 
going in Europe.65 More generally, the City Liaison Committee encouraged ‘practitioner 
input to the legislative process’ of the EEC by trying to raise awareness of EEC issues in City 
organisations, coordinating their discussions, and fostering exchange of information and of 
ideas on how best to influence the regulatory process.66 Lastly, as the biggest and the most 
international financial centre of the EEC, London enjoyed a high legitimacy in financial 
affairs, and could not be accused of lagging behind in terms of openness to EEC and foreign 
banks in general, a point that British banks did not fail to underline as a way to strengthen 
their position.67 
Contacts of course also existed at the national level with people who cumulated 
several responsibilities: national, European, and global. That was particularly the case of 
Peter Cooke who had been adviser to the governors with special reference to the EEC at the 
Bank of England from 1973 to 1976, chairman of the City EEC Liaison Committee, and 
thereafter head of banking supervision at the Bank of England, chairman of the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision (1977-1988), and member of the EEC Banking Advisory 
Committee, from its creation in 1979 to his retirement from the Bank of England in 1988 
(Goodhart 2011, 54–56).68 The Banking Advisory Committee (BAC) was a high-level 
committee in charge of drafting most EEC banking regulation proposals, and composed of 
delegates from member states and from the Commission. In 1984 and 1985, the BBA and 
Peter Cooke exchanged several letters on capital-related issues such as the use of 
subordinated debts and issues of international competition, while the Bank of England was 
reviewing its policy in the field: but it was all at the same time a Bank of England, a BCBS 
(i.e. global) and a BAC (i.e. EEC) question, since all three institutions of which Cooke was 
part of were discussing it at that time.69 
Contacts between the Commission or other EEC institutions also existed at the level 
of individual banks. In theory, the Commission did not favour this solution, as it preferred to 
deal with European organisations when talking to business associations. However, in the case 
of banking, the Banking Federation was considered as weak, and therefore welcomed 
initiatives by national associations and even by individual banks.70 In the case of major 
British banks, National Westminster was considered by the Commission as the one with 
which it had the closest contact, followed by Barclays and Midland, while Lloyds was a bit 
more distant.71 The question of direct representation in Brussels by British banks was 
regularly discussed internally, although they usually preferred to organize visits rather than 
having a permanent representation. In September and October 1981, National Westminster 
seriously considered opening such a representation office, partly because Midland and 
Barclays were themselves opening an EEC office at the time.72 National Westminster Bank 
eventually decided to reinforce the existing system based on regular visits to Brussels rather 
than creating an new one, which was considered too costly.73 But such contacts between 
individual British banks and the EEC institutions were commonplace, a feature that did not 
exist for French banks until the end of the 1980s, and was still then exceptional.74  
 Informality was a feature of the City that was famously disappearing, both in business 
practices and in regulation. Even if the EEC was not the only cause of the formalization of 
City life, it did confront the City to a very ambitious regulatory agenda. Beyond the sole 
question of regulating financial institutions’ behaviour, this agenda aimed at fostering 
economic integration and thereby supporting the European political project. This feature of 
the European project only increased in the 1980s: the 1985 White Paper for the Completion 
of the Internal Market designed an ambitious plan with about 300 directives to be enacted by 
the ‘Horizon 1992,’ many of which concerned the financial sector.75 However, the City found 
ways to protect its system and to turn regulation to its advantage. From the mid 1980s on, the 
Commission’s activity also seemed more attractive to the City community as it embraced a 
much more liberal approach to integration. The adoption of the mutual recognition principle, 
or the plans for the liberalisation of capital flows had both been called for by the BBA and 
the EBF in the 1981 paper already mentioned.76 In a 1988 City Liaison Committee meeting, 
Jeremy Morse, president of the BBA and of Lloyds Bank, thought ‘it was difficult not to be 
excited by the sense of movement’ and ‘overall […] saw the creation of the single market as 
a ‘plus sum’ game’.77 Once again, the CLC was instrumental in raising awareness of EEC 
stakes in the City through the organisation in 1988 of an extensive survey on how City 
practitioners viewed the coming completion of the single financial market.78 
Furthermore, by the 1980s, the global regulatory framework was changing fast, and 
the Basel Committee, on which the UK was well represented as Peter Cooke was its 
chairman, was working from 1982 on common regulatory standards in the field of capital 
adequacy (Drach 2019). The UK was famously instrumental in settling a secret agreement 
with the US on a preliminary standard measure, in order to force the other members of the 
Basel Committee – the Group of Ten countries plus Switzerland and Luxembourg – to accept 
the direction towards a formal common measure (Kapstein 1994; Wood 2005; Goodhart 
2011). Capital adequacy rules played a key role in international competition for banking, and 
British banks, although less at the forefront of the battle than US American banks, eventually 
embraced this move as they felt also threatened by what was seen as unfair competition from 
banks from countries with less stringent capital requirements. When its interests were at 





The City exerted an important influence on the EEC regulation in the financial area, a 
role which had been under-explored in the literature. On the other hand, the British accession 
to the EEC also played an important role in the transition of the City from a ‘gentlemanly 
capitalism’ to a ‘lobbying capitalism’ approach to regulation. At times the City was a 
political resource for the British financial industry to defend its interests, at other times it was 
the simple sum of its components. The City was also divided by competition between sectors 
and firms. It was not a coherent unit, and a substantial part of the influence it had on the 
Commission was exerted through each sector, such as banking, insurance, or securities 
activities. However, the City proved a useful political resource on the EEC stage. It was by 
far the biggest financial centre, and the only global financial centre in Europe, and as such, 
enjoyed a high reputation and legitimacy in financial activities (Cassis 2005). In addition, the 
City had a more pronounced community feeling than other financial centres in Europe, and 
the EEC threat trigered much more cohesiveness than there usually was, as a defensive move 
against a common ennemy. The existence of structures such as the City Liaison Committee 
and the City EEC Liaison Committee helped the coordination and information of financial 
associations on EEC matters. The influence of the British financial industry thus did not 
happen by the sole power of the weight of its financial centre: it necessitated the active 
involvement of various committees and institutions and a constant contact with Brussels and 
the British government to exert this influence. Of course, this does not mean that the City had 
an overwhelming influence over the EEC financial policy: EEC directives were always a 
compromise, so that other member states usually had a degree of satisfaction in each case. 
Furthermore, other countries had other channels, and these could be influential too: in France, 
the state played an important role in conveying the views of the financial industry to 
Brussels. However, the City played an important role in giving a more important British 
imprint on EEC financial regulation than in other areas. In the efficient and organised 
reaction to defend its interests and its age-old flexible approach to regulation, the City 
financial community became a key player of lobbying at the forefront of the European and 
global formalisation of regulation. This was a somewhat paradoxical result for a City 
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